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Abstract:	   Whilst	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   subject	   has	   been	   called	   into	   question	   by	   many	   diverse	  
approaches	  within	  contemporary	  political	  and	  social	  theory,	  there	  remains	  a	  focus	  upon	  agency,	  
now	  attributable	   to	   reformulated	  subjectivities	  or	  assemblages.	   I	  query	   the	  persistence	  of	   this	  
grammar	  of	   agency	   and	   ask	  whether	  politics	   can	  do	  without	   a	   scene	  of	   the	   subject.	  Spinoza’s	  
philosophy,	   in	   particular	   his	   conception	   of	   conatus,	   has	   inspired	   and	   offered	   some	   basis	   for	  
rethinking	  agency;	  I	  examine	  two	  such	  prominent	  positions	  (Judith	  Butler	  and	  Jane	  Bennett)	  and	  
argue	  that	  ultimately	  neither	  captures	  the	  political	  promise	  of	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy.	  Configuring	  
a	   concept	   of	  morphology	   to	   analyse	   this	   scene,	   my	   argument	   detaches	   the	   conatus	   from	   a	  
narrow	  focus	  upon	  human	  desire,	  and	  focuses	  attention	  upon	  the	  scene	  of	  the	  subject	  as	  folded	  
into	  a	  wider	  complex	  body.	  My	  approach	  also	   returns	  a	   study	  of	  power	   to	   the	  discussion:	   the	  
conatus	  is	  the	  power	  to	  persist	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  differential	  force	  and	  site	  of	  conflict.	  By	  placing	  the	  
spotlight	  on	  the	  scene	  of	  subjectivity	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  contemporary	  political	  theorist	  avoids	  the	  
false	   antinomy	   between	   agency	   and	   structure,	   whilst	   continuing	   to	   track	   the	   production	   and	  
composition	  of	  subjectivity	  in	  new	  political	  forms.	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The	  concept	  of	  the	  subject	  has	  been	  central	  to	  philosophical	  and	  political	  thought	  in	  the	  
modern	   age	   where	   it	   has	   most	   often	   served	   the	   function	   of	   essential	   ground	   for	  
metaphysical	  claims	  about	  knowledge	  and	  truth,	  or	  as	  a	  natural	  human	  foundation	  for	  
thinking	   about	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   terms	   and	   conditions	   of	   social	  
contract.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  since	  its	  inception,	  this	  concept	  has	  also	  revealed	  itself	  
to	  be	  neither	  stable	  nor	  self-­‐contained.	  This	  has	  furnished	  a	  range	  of	  approaches,	  each	  
calling	  into	  question	  its	  role	  in	  laying	  a	  foundation	  for	  philosophical	  thinking,	  and	  giving	  
rise	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  explorations	  seeking	  to	  reconfigure	  and	  sometimes	  displace	  the	  
subject.	   Such	   theoretical	   manoeuvres	   have	   had	   inevitable	   political	   consequences,	  
witnessed	   most	   clearly	   within	   structuralism,	   which	   for	   its	   many	   critics	   exposed	   an	  
abiding	  tension	  between	  a	   form	  of	  anti-­‐humanism,	  where	  the	  role	   for	   the	  agency	  and	  
subjectivity	  was	  unwittingly	  dissolved,	  and	  an	  all-­‐consuming	  concept	  of	  structure	  where	  
lurked	   a	   dangerous	   supra-­‐subjectivism	   (notably	   labelled	   by	   Paul	   Ricouer	   as	   a	   form	   of	  
Kantianism	   without	   the	   transcendental	   subject);	   a	   tension	   eliciting	   the	   well-­‐known	  
political	  slogan	  of	  May	  68:	  structures	  do	  not	  march	  on	  the	  streets!	  In	  practice,	  and	  with	  
growing	  theoretical	  awareness,	  anti-­‐humanists	  were	  concerned	  less	  with	  abolishing	  the	  
subject	   and	   replacing	   it	   with	   a	   new	   foundation,	   and	   more	   with	   charting	   the	   subtle	  
production	  of	  its	  multiple	  conditions	  of	  existence.	  	  
	  
My	   intention	   is	   not	   to	   return	   directly	   to	   these	   now	   well-­‐rehearsed	   debates,	   but	   to	  
highlight	  a	  similar	  series	  of	  tensions,	  albeit	  with	  different	  inflections,	  that	  are	  strikingly	  
evident	  in	  forms	  of	  contemporary	  critical	  thought.	  Here,	  a	  turn	  to	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy	  
has	   inspired	   and	   offered	   some	   basis	   for	   rethinking	   both	   the	   form	   or	   genesis	   of	  
subjectivity,	  specifically	  its	  ethical	  comportment,	  and	  for	  unravelling	  the	  subject	  within	  a	  
posthuman	   ontological	   setting.	   Paradoxically,	   these	   diverse	   turns	   to	   Spinoza	   have	  
entailed	   attention	   be	   directed	   away	   from	   the	   subject	   and	   toward	   a	   foregrounding	   of	  
processes	   of	   discursive	   or	   material	   production.	   Indeed,	   like	   earlier	   forms	   of	   anti-­‐
humanism,	  these	  new	  positions	  hardly	  present	  a	  total	  eclipse	  of	  the	  modern	  grammar	  of	  
subjectivity.	  The	  focus	  continues	  to	  be	  upon	  the	  agency	  of	  matter,	  objects	  or	  things,	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  regard	  for	  human	  implication,	  and	  imbrication,	  within	  material	  and	  discursive	  
processes.	  Not	  a	  surpassing	  of	  the	  human,	  then,	  but	  a	  recasting	  and	  recontextualising	  of	  
its	  precise	  terms	  of	  reference	  (Wolfe,	  2010;	  Braidotti,	  2013).	   If	  the	  reverberations	  of	  a	  
crisis	   of	   the	   subject	   of	   modern	   philosophy	   continue,	   efforts	   still	   abound	   in	   the	  
theorisation	  of	  new	  conceptions	  of	  agency	  now	  attributable	  to	  reformulated,	  dispersed,	  
or	   discursive	   subjectivities,	   or	   to	   non-­‐subjective	   forms,	   fields,	   and	   assemblages.	   How	  
might	  we	  understand	  this	  sustained	  interest	  in	  agency	  alongside	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  
elision	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  subject?	  We	  might	  want	  to	   inquire	  whether	  politics	  can	  do	  
without	  this	  scene	  of	  the	  subject	  -­‐	  even	  as	  it	  claims	  to	  reconceive	  its	  political	  forms	  and	  
metaphysical	  status.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  article	  I	  intend	  to	  respond	  to	  these	  problems	  by	  placing	  a	  spotlight	  precisely	  upon	  
this	   scene	  of	   subjectivity.	   Inspired	  by	  my	  own	  engagement	  with	  Spinoza,	   I	   configure	  a	  
conceptual	   tool,	   what	   I	   here	   call	   a	   morphology,	   to	   help	   investigate	   and	   map	   the	  
ontological	   shape	  and	   force	  of	   this	   scene.i
	  
This	   idea	  of	  morphology	  has	   two	   important	  
dimensions	  that	  I	  briefly	  elucidate.	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  processual.	  It	  encourages	  a	  dynamic	  view	  
of	   the	  unfinished	   formation	  of	   the	   subject,	   conceived	  as	  only	  one	  element	  or	   relation	  
among	   a	   collection	   of	   many	   other	   bodies	   and	   things.	   A	   temporal	   series	   of	   potential	  
relations	  might	  compose	  a	  morphology	  when	  various	  parts	   ‘stick’,	  conjoin,	  combine	  or	  
cohere	   as	   a	   dynamic	   form	   that	   is	   always	   in	   the	   process	   of	   metamorphosis.ii
	  
If	   this	  
concept	   of	   morphology	   is	   ontological,	   as	   I	   suggest	   it	   is,	   it	   nonetheless	   lacks	   a	   single	  
centre,	  an	  essence,	  a	  simple	  unity;	  we	  might	  instead	  usefully	  think	  about	  its	  composition	  
as	  an	  economy	  of	  differential	  relations.	  Secondly,	  morphology,	  as	  it	  is	  conceived	  here,	  is	  
characterised	   by	   a	   tendency	   toward	   persistence	   and	   perseverance	   as	   much	   as	  
mututation	  and	  transformation.	  To	  comprehend	  the	  question	  of	  forming	  and	  formation	  
as	   an	   activity	   intrinsic	   to	   all	   bodies	   and	   things,	   I	   turn	   to	   Spinoza.	   In	   particular,	   his	  
concept	  of	  conatus	  as	  the	  power	  of	  each	  thing	  to	  ‘persevere	  in	  its	  being’	  (EIII,	  P6iii)	  helps	  
draw	  out	   the	  political	  contours	  of	   this	  morphology,	  as	  well	  as	   to	   indicate	  some	  of	   the	  
ways	   in	  which	  politics	   itself	   is	  always	   its	  mode	  of	  composition.	  To	  remain	  close	   to	   the	  
tenor	  of	  Spinoza’s	  radical	  philosophy	  of	  nature,	  I	  claim	  the	  conatus	  is	  best	  considered	  as	  
a	  non-­‐subjective	  principle,	  as	  an	  essential	  characteristic	  of	  all	  things,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  most	  
usefully	  conceived	  beyond	  or	  outside	  the	  subject,	  in	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  an	  ontology	  of	  
relation.	  This	  approach,	  however,	  will	  not	  elide	  the	  subject,	  and	  the	  intention	  here	  is	  to	  
track	  its	  production	  amidst	  the	  morphological	  relations	  of	  which	  it	  is	  a	  part.	   
	  
A	  number	  of	  contemporary	   theorists	  have	  been	  similarly	  drawn	   in	   recent	  years	   to	   the	  
power	  of	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy.	  Two	  theorists,	  in	  particular,	  stand	  out	  for	  consideration	  
in	   the	   argument	   developed	   here	   since	   both	   share	   my	   regard	   for	   the	   way	   in	   which	  
dominant	   philosophies	   of	   the	   subject	  must	   be	   unravelled	   and	   reconfigured,	   and	   both	  
draw	   -­‐	   albeit	   in	   quite	   different	  ways	   -­‐	   upon	   Spinoza’s	   concept	   of	   conatus.	   First,	   Jane	  
Bennett’s	   recent	   influential	  work	  Vibrant	  Matter	   theorises	   a	  new	   form	  of	  materialism	  
where	  nature	  and	  life	  are	  dispersed	  processes	  and	  complexly	  constructed	  sites,	  and	  the	  
agency	   of	   non-­‐human	   assemblages	   is	   brought	   into	   play	   (Bennett,	   2010,	   2012).	   This	  
attention	   to	   a	   non-­‐human	   milieu	   of	   actants	   is	   attuned	   to	   its	   own	   resonances	   with	  
Spinoza’s	   philosophy.	   Suggesting	   that	   what	   she	   calls	   thing-­‐power	   ‘bears	   a	   family	  
resemblance’	  to	  Spinoza’s	  concept	  of	  conatus,	  Bennett	  seeks	  to	  dislodge	  the	  superiority	  
of	   human	   power	   or	   agency	   (2010,	   p.2).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   (and	   somewhat	  
problematically	  for	  my	  own	  argument	  here),	  Bennett	  acknowledges	  that	  ‘the	  otherwise	  
important	  topic	  of	  subjectivity...	  gets	  short	  shrift’	  in	  her	  book,	  so	  she	  might	  focus	  instead	  
‘on	  the	  task	  of	  developing	  a	  vocabulary	  and	  syntax	  for,	  and	  thus	  a	  better	  discernment	  
of,	   the	  active	  powers	   issuing	   from	  non-­‐subjects’	   (2010,	  p.ix,	  emphasis	  added).	  Second,	  
Judith	   Butler’s	   writings,	   expansive	   in	   their	   range	   and	   contribution,	   have	   often	   traced	  
precisely	   the	  weight	  of	   a	   paradox	   intrinsic	   to	   the	  ontological	   formation	  of	   the	  human	  
subject.	   For	   her,	   the	   subject	   describes	   a	   dual	   process	   where	   self-­‐becoming,	   or	   self-­‐	  
formation,	  is	  inseparable	  from	  a	  subjugation	  to	  power.	  Subjection	  thus	  names	  a	  general	  
trope,	   or	   retro-­‐active	   turning	   of	   the	   subject	   back	   upon	   itself	   to	   delineate	   the	   very	  
possibility	  of	  subjectivity	  (see	  Butler,	  1997,	  chp	  1).	  ‘Part	  of	  the	  difficulty,’	  Butler	  reasons,	  
‘is	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  itself	  a	  site	  of	  this	  ambivalence	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  emerges	  both	  
as	   the	   effect	   of	   a	   prior	   power	   and	   as	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   a	   radically	  
conditioned	  form	  of	  agency’	   (1997,	  p.14-­‐15).	  Neither	  constitutive	  nor	  constituted,	  and	  
without	   the	   power	   of	   determination,	   that	   which	   Butler	   continues	   to	   call	   the	   subject	  
must	   live	  out	   this	  paradox,	  or	  vacillation,	  at	   the	  heart	  of	  power	  relations.	   In	  her	  more	  
recent	   writings,	   Butler	   recasts	   this	   already	   decomposed	   subject	   within	   the	   realm	   of	  
ethics	  and	  responsibility	  where,	  following	  closely	  on	  Spinoza’s	  trail,	  she	  posits	  ‘a	  certain	  
desire	   to	   persist’,	   a	   force	   of	   conative	   striving	   ‘that	   underwrites	   recognition,	   so	   that	  
forms	  of	  recognition	  or,	  indeed,	  forms	  of	  judgement	  that	  seek	  to	  relinquish	  or	  destroy,	  
the	   desire	   to	   persist,	   the	   desire	   for	   life	   itself	   undercut	   the	   very	   preconditions	   of	  
recognition’	  (Butler,	  2005,	  p.44).	   
I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  positions	  of	  either	  Bennett	  or	  Butler	  be	  described	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Spinozist	   in	   any	   straightforward	   sense. iv
	  
Furthermore,	   the	   theoretical	   differences	  
between	  the	  two	  are	  pronounced,	  even	  though	  at	  times	  the	  ethico-­‐political	  resonances	  
of	   their	   writings	   might	   share	   a	   common	   space.	   Their	   mobilisations	   of	   Spinoza	   are	  
nonetheless	  significant;	  they	  point	  especially	  to	  the	  political	  stakes	  of,	  and	  the	  possible	  
resources	   to	   be	   found	   within,	   and	   beyond,	   humanist	   discourses.	   Following	   an	  
engagement	  with	  both	  theorists,	  I	  will	  conclude	  that	  neither	  position	  fully	  explores	  the	  
potentialities	  inherent	  in	  Spinoza’s	  thought,	  and	  specifically	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  concept	  of	  
conatus.	  Ultimately,	  Butler’s	  psychoanalytic	   formulations	  of	   the	   conatus	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  
essence	  or	  desire	  tethers	  subjectivity	  too	  closely	  to	  a	  form	  of	  humanism,	  and	  opens	  her	  
position	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  criticisms	  that	  my	  own	  reading	  of	  Spinoza	  hopes	  to	  avoid.	  Neither	  
does	  Bennett’s	  bracketing	  of	  what	  I	  call	  here	  ‘the	  scene	  of	  subjectivity’	  end	  up	  able	  to	  
bypass	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  subject.	  It	  may	  be	  the	  case,	  as	  the	  new	  materialist	  could	  argue,	  
that	   the	   subject	   unravels	   to	   such	   a	   degree	   that	   theory	   can	   no	   longer	   lay	   hold	  of	   any	  
subject.	   The	   risk	   of	   this	   position,	   in	  my	   view,	   is	   a	   repetition	   of	   the	   position	   of	   ‘high’	  
structuralism	  where	   the	   philosophical	   grammar	   of	   the	   subject	   emerges	   once	   again	   in	  
another	   (possibly	  every)	  place:	   the	  world	  becomes	  subjectivised.	  This	  kind	  of	  position,	  
this	  risk,	  must	  be	  avoided.	   
	  
The	   distinctive	   morphology	   for	   thinking	   through	   subjectivity	   developed	   here	   remains	  
sensitive	   to	   the	   dangers	   of	   continuing	   to	   work	   with,	   and	   utilise,	   the	   concept	   of	   the	  
subject	   in	   a	   reconfigured	   sense.	   In	   my	   view,	   the	   matter	   of	   subjectivity	   is	   always	   a	  
political	   matter.	   For	   this	   reason,	   I	   am	   reluctant	   to	   relinquish	   it.	   If	   it	   is	   the	   case	   that	  
human	  subjects	  can	  no	   longer	  be	  understood	  to	  stand	  alone	  as	   the	  single	  principle	  or	  
fulcrum	  of	  organisation	   for	  collective	   life,	  a	  stronger	  materialist	  account	   is	   required	  of	  
the	  morphology	  of	  subjectivity,	  its	  coming	  into	  being	  as	  an	  arrangement	  of	  parts	  or	  as	  a	  
temporary	   formation	   that	  might	   be	   subject	   to	   capture	   or	   combination,	   containment,	  
exchange,	  and	   transformation.	   It	   is	   these	  political	   relations	  of	   figuration	  and	  mutation	  
that	   my	   own	   engagement	   with	   Spinoza	   intends	   to	   develop.	   In	   my	   reading	   of	   it,	   the	  
conatus	   becomes	   inextricably	   tied	   to	   the	   movement	   of	   power	   and	   force	   revealing,	   I	  
suggest,	  something	  akin	  to	  the	  life	  of	  power	  upon	  the	  field	  of	  subjectivity.	  Against	  post-­‐
structuralist	  theories	  that	  all	   too	  readily	  missed	  the	  materialist	  component	  of	  analysis,	  
reducing	  the	  subject	  to	  a	  symbolic,	  linguistic	  or	  discursive	  effect	  only	  to	  later	  resurrect,	  
resignify	  and	  rearticulate	  a	  new	  human	  form,	  the	  concept	  of	  morphology	  brings	  a	  more	  
nuanced,	   materialist	   understanding	   of	   the	   scene	   of	   subjectivity,	   bodies,	   and	   things,	  
shedding	  light	  on	  political	  relations	  that	  might	  otherwise	  remain	  hidden.	   
	  
My	  argument	  takes	  the	   following	  structure.	   I	  begin	  Part	   I	  with	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy	   in	  
order	   to	   elucidate	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   conatus	   at	   stake.	   Part	   II	   explores	   the	   different 
interpretations	   of	   Spinoza	   by	   Butler	   and	   Bennett.	   This	   allows	   me	   to	   set	   in	   play	   and	  
delineate	  some	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  my	  own	  morphology	  of	  subjectivity,	  which	  I	  set	  
out	  further	  in	  Part	  III.	  Here	  I	  demonstrate	  the	  profound	  political	  sense	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
the	   conatus,	   and	   establish	   its	   utility	   in	   a	   morphological	   analysis	   of	   the	   scene	   of	  
subjectivity.	  	  
	  
I.	  Thinking	  beyond	  the	  Subject	  with	  Spinoza:	  or,	  what	  exactly	  does	  Spinoza	  understand	  
by	  the	  conatus?	   
We	  find	  very	  few	  (in	  fact,	  only	  two)	  direct	  references	  to	  the	  subject	  in	  Spinoza’s	  Ethics.v
	  
This	  is	  in	  part	  because	  the	  subjectum,	  that	  which	  Foucault	  has	  theorised	  as	  the	  empirico-­‐	  
transcendental	   doublet	   of	   modern	   thought,	   had	   yet	   to	   crystallize	   and	   master	   the	  
elements	   and	   relations	   governing	   its	   formation	   as	   the	   leitmotif	  of	  modern	  philosophy	  
(see	  Foucault,	  1970).	  There	  is,	  arguably,	  no	  grammatical	  ‘I’	  in	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy.	  But	  
it	  is	  also	  because	  Spinoza’s	  view	  of	  the	  world	  as	  substance	  requires	  no	  theory	  or	  faculty	  
of	  consciousness	  and	  subjectivity	  as	  interiority,	  since	  its	  starting	  point	  precludes	  the	  kind	  
of	   containment	   or	   identity	   that	   has	   generally	   accompanied	   such	   a	   theory.	   Spinoza’s	  
philosophy	  avoids	  the	  lure	  of	  anthropocentrism;	  his	  concern	  is	  with	  the	  production	  of	  an	  
individuum	   (for	  which	  more	   than	   fifty	   references	   in	   the	  Ethics)	   conceived	   always	   as	   a	  
composite	  of	  bodies	  and	  relations	  between	  parts,	  so	  that	  even	  the	  human	  body	  requires	  
a	  wider	  body	  of	  organic	  and	  inorganic	  forms	  to	  maintain	  its	  existence.	  This	  premodern	  
concept	   of	   individuum	   thus	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   liberal	   notions	   that	   we	   tend	   to	  
associate	  with	  the	  bounded	   individual	  and	  possessive	   individualism.	  When	   in	  Part	   II	  of	  
the	  Ethics	   Spinoza	   constructs	   an	   ontology	   of	   the	   production	   of	   complex	   bodies	   as	   an	  
individuum	  (EIII,	  P13-­‐14),	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  their	  composition	  (and	  decomposition)	  is	  a	  
dynamic	  and	  continuous	  process:	   
When	   a	   number	   of	   bodies,	   whether	   of	   the	   same	   or	   different	   size,	   are	   so	  
constrained	   by	   other	   bodies	   that	   they	   lie	   upon	   one	   another,	   or	   if	   they	   so	  move,	  
whether	   with	   the	   same	   degree	   or	   different	   degrees	   of	   speed,	   that	   they	  
communicate	   their	  motions	   to	  each	  other	   in	  a	   certain	   fixed	  manner,	  we	   shall	   say	  
that	  those	  bodies	  are	  united	  with	  one	  another	  and	  that	  they	  all	  together	  compose	  
one	   body	   or	   Individual,	   which	   is	   distinguished	   from	   the	   others	   by	   this	   union	   of	  
bodies	  (EII	  P13	  Def)	   
	  
Recent	   continental	   scholarship	   has	   drawn	   attention	   to	   the	   ideas	   of	   encounter	   and	  
relation	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  Spinoza’s	  ontology	  (Balibar,	  1997,	  1998;	  Deleuze,	  1988a;	  
Morfino,	  2006).	  Building	  upon	  these	  approaches,	  I	  view	  Spinoza’s	  ontology	  of	  substance	  
not	  as	  the	  figure	  of	  a	  sub-­‐stantia	  as	  ground,	  or	  foundation	  of	  all	  forms.	  All	  forms	  (better,	  
morphologies)	  of	  life	  are	  modifications	  of	  an	  infinite,	  non-­‐teleological	  substance	  that	  is	  
best	  described	  as	  a	  field	  of	  variations	  or	  differences	  where	  each	  mode	  of	  substance,	  or	  
genera	   of	   being,	   is	   constituted	   by	   relations	   of	   encounter	   and	   interaction	   with	   other	  
modes	  (see	  Spinoza,	  Letter	  32).	  Central	  to	  this	  dynamic	  ontology	  of	  becoming	  must	  be	  
its	   intensive	   quality	   whereby	   bodies	   of	   all	   kinds	   (there	   is	   no	   clear	   distinction	   and	  
necessary	   autonomy	   between	   human	   and	   non-­‐human	   bodies)	   are	   constituted	   by	  
degrees	   of	   power.	   To	   explore	   the	   dynamic	   form	   of	   a	   body’s	   degree	   of	   power,	   Gilles	  
Deleuze	  thinks	  of	  Spinoza’s	  Ethics	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ethology.	  ‘Ethology’,	  he	  writes,	  ‘is	  first	  of	  
all	  the	  study	  of	  the	  relations	  of	  speed	  and	  slowness,	  of	  the	  capacities	  for	  affecting	  and	  
being	   affected	   that	   characterise	   each	   thing’	   (Deleuze,	   1988a,	   p.125).	   Thus,	   we	  
understand	   a	   body	   not	   in	   terms	  of	   its	   distinct	   properties,	   qualities,	   and	   functions	   but	  
instead	  as	  a	   ratio	  of	   forces	   that	  are	   in	   turn	  composed	  of	   relations	  of	  speed,	  slowness,	  
rest,	  agreement,	  and	  disagreement.	  This	  ethological	  rendering	  of	  the	  affective	  power	  of	  
a	  body	  is	  highly	  important	  and	  influential,	  evidenced	  in	  the	  wide	  utility	  of	  Deleuze	  and	  
Guattari’s	   related	  concept	  of	  assemblage.	  For	  Spinoza,	  affect	  names	  a	  power	  to	  affect	  
and	  be	  affected,	  thus	  making	  the	  body	  a	  site	  of	  transformation	  and	  production,	  but	  also	  
ambivalence	  and	  vacillation	  (see	  Williams,	  2010).	  The	  idea	  of	  morphology	  that	  I	  develop	  
below	  must	  encompass	  Deleuze’s	  Spinozist	  ethology	  of	  bodies,	  and	   it	  must	  be	  able	   to	  
configure	  this	   intensive	  and	  extremely	  variable	  quality	  of	  affective	  power	  as	  one	  of	   its	  
aspects.	   We	   can	   now	   begin	   to	   understand	   the	   desubjectifying	   effect	   of	   Spinoza’s	  
philosophy.	   Spinoza	   offers	   us	   the	   means	   to	   think	   the	   scene	   of	   subjectivity	   without	  
reference	  to	  the	  metaphysical	  subject.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  paradoxical	  claim	  I	  
turn	  now	  to	  trace	  in	  his	  philosophy	  the	  operations	  of	  an	  active,	  non-­‐subjective	  conatus.	  
This	   concept	   is	   arguably	   the	   key	   starting	  point	   for	   Spinoza’s	   political	   theory.	   So,	  what	  
exactly	  does	  Spinoza	  understand	  by	  the	  conatus?	  	  
	  
Spinoza	  and	  the	  Physics	  of	  Encounter	   
For	  Spinoza,	  living	  organisms	  are	  distinguished	  from	  inorganic	  ones	  only	  by	  their	  degree	  
of	   complexity	   and	   their	   capacity	   to	  establish	  more	   intensive	   levels	  of	   interaction	  with	  
other	   things	   without	   sacrificing	   their	   composite	   power.	   All	   composite	   bodies	   or	  
individuum	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  maintain	  their	  consistency	  as	  a	  certain	  ratio	  or	  balance	  of	  
physical	   integrity.	   Spinoza	   thus	   defines	   the	   active	   verb	   conatur	   as	   ‘a	   body’s	   natural	  
tendency	  to	  move	  in	  a	  certain	  way’	  (PCP	  Part	  III	  Def).	  Conatus	  is	  the	  name	  for	  the	  power	  
of	  each	  thing	  to	  ‘persevere	  in	  its	  being’	  (E	  III,	  P6),	  to	  strive	  for	  improbable	  permanence	  
and	  indefinite	  existence	  beyond	  the	  present.	  There	  is	  no	  necessary	  or	  exclusive	  relation	  
between	  the	  conatus	  and	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  human	  subject,	  and	  care	  must	  be	  taken	  
not	  to	  anthropologize	  Spinoza’s	  meaning	  of	  it.	  Indeed,	  in	  his	  early	  engagement	  with,	  and	  
critique	   of	   Descartes,	   Spinoza	  makes	   clear	   that	   such	   a	   striving	  must	   be	   attached	   not	  
simply	  to	  a	  thought,	  or	  a	  purely	  human	  endeavour,	  but	  to	  the	  boundless	  form	  of	  matter	  
itself	  (PCP,	  Part	  III,	  Postulate).	  He	  is	  also	  explicit	  in	  his	  view	  that	  one	  must	  not	  distinguish	  
between	  cause	  and	  effect,	  or	  the	  thing	  and	  its	  striving.	  Of	  those	  confused	  philosophers	  
who	   continue	   to	   labour	   under	   such	   prejudices,	   (and	   anticipating	   Nietzsche’s	   more	  
frequently	  cited	  critique),	  Spinoza	  writes,	   
...they	   distinguish	   between	   the	   thing	   itself	   and	   the	   striving	   that	   is	   in	   each	  
thing	   to	   preserve	   its	   being,	   although	   they	   do	   not	   know	   what	   they	  
understand	  by	  striving.	  For	  though	  the	  thing	  and	   its	  striving	  to	  preserve	   its	  
being	  are	  distinguished	  by	  reason,	  or	  rather	  verbally	   (which	  deceives	  these	  
people	   very	   greatly),	   they	   are	   not	   in	   any	  way	   really	   distinct	   (Spinoza,	   PCP	  
Appendix,	  p.314).	   
	  
It	  seems	  inadequate,	  therefore,	  to	  project	  upon	  Spinoza’s	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  
conatus	   a	   retrospective	   ontological	   account	   of	   human	   nature	   as	   self-­‐movement	   and	  
self-­‐	  preservation.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  through	  such	  a	  projection	  that	  some	  scholars	  begin	  
to	   insert	   Spinoza’s	  political	  philosophy	   into	  a	   social	   contract	   tradition	   (Feuer,	  1987),	   a	  
move	   that	   succeeds	   only	   partially	   because	   Spinoza’s	   thought	   cannot	   wholly	   be	  
contained	  within	  a	  state	  of	  nature	  argument	  (see	  also	  Balibar,	  1998).	  Evidently,	  such	  a	  
move	  also	  elides	  the	  ontology	  of	  encounter	  described	  above,	  as	  well	  as	  establishing	  the	  
conatus	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  transcendental	  a	  priori	  category	  that	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy	  always	  
fought	  rigorously	  against	  (see	  EI,	  Appendix).	   
	  
Drawing	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  this	  arguably	  faulty	  humanist	  reading,	  a	  key	  discussion	  among	  
some	   commentators	   has	   centred	   upon	   whether	   the	   conatus	   can	   be	   stretched	   to	  
incorporate	  institutions	  as	  well	  as	  individuals.	  It	  seems	  illogical,	  they	  reason,	  to	  apply	  a	  
psychological	  and	  individualist	  concept	  like	  the	  conatus	  to	  an	  institutional	  structure	  such	  
as	   the	   state.vi
	  
However,	   to	   argue	   on	   such	   grounds	   that	   the	   state	   cannot	   possess	   a	  
conative	  -­‐	  or	  for	  that	  matter	  a	  counter-­‐conative	  -­‐	  tendency	  is	  to	  ignore	  the	  differential	  
relations	  of	  force	  and	  power	  that	  constitute	  the	  state	  as	  an	  institutional	  body	  forever	  in	  
the	  making.	  Following	  the	  reasoning	  about	  the	  conatus	  developed	  here,	  the	  state	  may	  
be	   understood	   as	   possessing	   a	   complex	   collective	   tendency	   to	   persevere	   in	   its	   own	  
being.	  Whilst	   it	  might	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	   in	  the	  Ethics	  Spinoza	  does	  mostly	  examine	  
the	   conatus	   in	   its	   human	   situation	   as	   a	   form	   of	   desire,	   if	   we	   take	   into	   account	   the	  
general	  claims	  of	  his	  ontology	  substantiated	  above,	   it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  
such	   a	   debate	   appear	   to	   miss	   a	   vital	   point:	   the	   conatus	   principle	   is	   an	   essential	  
characteristic	   of	   all	   things	   and	   is	   most	   usefully	   conceived	   outside	   the	   subject,	   in	   the	  
wider	   context	   of	   an	   ontology	   of	   relation.	   But	   how	   might	   the	   striving	   of	   this	   non-­‐
subjective	  conatus	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  field	  of	  subjectivation?	   
	  
Placed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Spinoza’s	   ontology	   of	   relation,	   conative	   striving	   may	   be	  
described,	  with	  Spinoza,	  as	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  thing	  (EIII	  P7),	  but	  only	  if	  we	  underscore	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  the	  metaphysical	  notion	  of	  a	  pure	  essence	  is	  challenged,	  or	  disrupted.	  The	  
essence	  of	   a	   thing	  undergoes	  mutation	   and	   variation,	   and	   it	   is	   only	   in	   this	   sense	   that	  
what	   Deleuze	   calls	   the	   elasticity	   of	   the	   conatus	   can	   be	   understood	   (Deleuze,	   1990,	  
p.222).	  There	  are	  no	  properties	  and	  functions	  of	  a	  body	  that	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  an	  elemental	  
relationality.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   human being,	   Spinoza,	   like	   Hegel	   after	   him,	   locates	   the	  
conatus	   in	   desire.	   But	   desire	   should	   not	   be	   read	   simply	   as	   a	   subjective	   automaton,	  
impulse,	   or	   drive.	   This	   would	   be	   (once	   again)	   to	   humanise	   and	   essentialise	   Spinoza’s	  
thought,	   and	   to	   deprive	   the	   conatus	   of	   the	   relational	   reciprocities	   characterising	   the	  
field	   of	   an	   infinitely	   variable	   nature,	   which	   Georges	   Canguilhem	   elegantly	   terms	   the	  
‘poetic	   horizon’	   of	   natura	   naturans,	   and	   Foucault	   associate	   with	   power	   (Canguilhem,	  
1994,	  p.311;	  Foucault,	  1990,	  p.92).	  Rather,	  the	  conatus	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  field	  of	  
forces	   whose	   inevitable	   existence	   is	   caught	   up	   in	   the	   dynamic	   play	   of	   conflictual	  
relations.	  It	  is	  in	  and	  through	  this	  deeply	  political	  process	  that	  shapes	  of	  subjectivity	  are	  
mobilised	   and	   take	   form.	   Indeed,	   perhaps	   the	   conatus	   is	   precisely	   this	   open	   series	   of	  
power	   relations	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   every	  mode	   of	   existence:	   the	   power	   (of	   all	   things)	   to	  
persist	  (and	  to	  desist,	  or	  resist);	  a	  configuration	  of	  forces	  that	  are	  internal	  and	  not	  prior	  
to	  the	  conflict	  itself.	  Such	  a	  formulation	  places	  the	  conatus	  at	  the	  heart,	  at	  the	  centre,	  of	  
power	   relations	   and	   secures	   an	   important	   element	   of	   a	   morphology	   of	   subjectivity	  
without	  the	  metaphysical	  subject.	   
	  
There	   is	  another	  aspect	  of	  this	  morphology	  that	  remains	  to	  be	  uncovered.	   In	  Part	   II	  of	  
the	  Ethics,	  Spinoza	  proposes	  that	  ‘the	  order	  and	  connection	  of	  ideas	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  
order	   and	   connection	  between	   things’	   (EII	   P7).	   This	  brings	   to	  mind	   the	   conative	   force	  
and	  political	  power	  of	  ideas	  in	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy.	  Hasana	  Sharp	  (2011)	  has	  identified	  
a	  tendency	  within	  studies	  of	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy	  toward	  a	  one-­‐sided	  account	  of	  bodies	  
at	   the	   expense	   of	   ideas.	   Spinoza’s	   nunaced	   materialism	   accords	   ideas	   their	   material	  
weight;	  my	  own	  approach	  intends	  to	  avoid	  both	  a	  one-­‐sided	  analysis	  that	  focuses	  only	  
on	  bodies	  and	   things,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  critique,	  advanced	  most	  powerfully	  by	  Ruth	  Leys,	  
that	  presents	  materialist	   theories	  of	  affective	  process	  as	  having	  almost	  nothing	   to	   say	  
about	  the	  political	  realm	  of	   ideas,	  beliefs,	  and	  ideology	  (Leys,	  2011,	  p.450-­‐511,	  p.466).	  
Implicating	   readings	  of	  Spinoza	  within	  her	  critique,	  Leys	  argues	   that	   the	   turn	   to	  affect	  
has	   reinstated	   a	   dualism	  between	  mind	   and	   body,	   between	   the	   realms	   of	   rationality,	  
cognition,	   and	   the	   representation	   of	   these	   as	   beliefs	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   affective,	  
non-­‐cognitive,	   non-­‐representational	   states	   on	   the	   other.	   For	   Spinoza,	   these	   two	  
attributes	  exist	  simultaneously	   in	  his	  ontology	  (where	  mind	  is	  thinking	  body,	  and	  ideas	  
are	   dynamic	   activities	   imbued	   with	   affective	   resonance).	   Placing	   this	   alongside	   the	  
highly	  influential	  position	  of	  Louis	  Althusser,	  who	  rediscovered	  in	  Spinoza	  the	  matrix	  of	  
every	  possible	  theory	  of	  ideology,	  exposes	  the	  radical	  terms	  of	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy	  (see	  
Williams,	   2013).	   Althusser’s	   conception	   of	   ideology	   as	   an	   imaginary	   relation	   famously	  
removed	   the	   agency	   of	   ideas	   from	   the	   human	   subject;	   these	   were	   not	   rejected	   but	  
firmly	   embedded	  within	   material	   practices	   (Althusser,	   1971).	   In	   this	   context,	   Sharp’s	  
strategy	  of	  renaturalisation	  is	  highly	  relevant	  since	  it	  helps	  draw	  attention	  to	  a	  powerful	  
forcefield	   of	   ideas	   irreducible	   to	   the	   thinking	   subject	   as	   their	   author.	   Thus,	   ideas	   are	  
living	   things	   that	   require	   ‘revision,	   critique	   and	  pruning.’	   Ideas	   ‘resist	   other	   ideas	   and	  
endeavour	  to	  persevere	  and	  enhance	  themselves’;	  they	  are	  ‘determined	  and	  dependent	  
upon	  the	  forces	  and	  strivings	  of	  other	  ideas,	  just	  like	  the	  being	  of	  bodies’	  (Sharp,	  2011,	  
p74,	  p75,	  p76).	  Given	  the	  immense	  power	  of	  ideas	  to	  mobilise masses,	  to	  communicate	  
and	  nourish	  the	  force	  of	  things,	  to	  capture	  and	  hold	  political	  elements	  and	  relations	  in	  
place,	  the	  morphology	  developed	  here	  will	  underscore	  the	  conative	  force	  of	  ideas,	  signs	  
and	  images	  as	  impersonal,	  non-­‐subjective,	  autonomous	  conductors	  of	  power,	  affect,	  as	  
well	  as	  being	  part	  of	  the	  scene	  of	  subjectivity	  itself.vii
	   
	  
In	  this	  first	  section,	  I	  have	  identified	  within	  Spinoza’s	  dynamic	  philosophy	  the	  resources	  
to	  develop	  a	  morphology	  to	  encompass	  the	  scene	  of	  subjectivity	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  a	  
philosophy	  of	  the	  subject.	  This	  analysis	  accentuates	  the	  mutual	  imbrication	  of	  ontology	  
and	  politics,	  attends	  to	  the	  risks	  of	  anthropomorphism	  and	  humanist	  strains	  of	  politics,	  
and	   theorises	   the	   conatus	   as	   a	   site	   of	   power	   and	   conflict.viii
	  
Let	   us	   now	   consider	   the	  
interpretations	  of	   Spinoza	  developed	  by	  Butler	   and	  Bennett.	  How	  do	   these	  distinctive	  
turns	  to	  Spinoza	  develop	  his	  theory	  of	  conatus?	  	  
	  
II.	  Thinking	  through	  Spinoza’s	  concept	  of	  conatus	   
Judith	  Butler:	  Desire	  for	  life,	  or	  life	  of	  power?	   
Few	   commentators	   have	   addressed	   adequately	   Butler’s	   enduring	   interest	   in	   Spinoza’s	  
philosophy,	   or	   the	   concept	   of	   conatus,	  which	   she	   claims	   ‘remains	   at	   the	   core’	   of	   her	  
work	   (2004,	  p.198,	  p.235-­‐36).ix
	  	  
These	  critics	  have	   tended	   to	  argue	   that	   the	  conatus	  –	  
and	  her	  Spinozism	  -­‐	  introduce	  thick	  ontological	  categories	  that	  undermine	  the	  power	  of	  
political	   critique	   in	   Butler’s	   theory	   (Carver	   and	   Chambers,	   2008,	   Chp	   5,	   Lloyd,	   2008;	  
Chambers,	  2004,	  White,	  2000).	  These	  are	  certainly	  valid	   interpretations	  but	  they	  need	  
pushing	  further,	  however,	  lest	  we	  reduce	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy,	  together	  with	  the	  kinds	  
of	  political	  critique	  opened	  up	  by	   it,	   to	  the	  very	  terms	  of	  Butler’s	  own	  reading	  of	  him.	  
Whilst	  Spinoza’s	  thought	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  development	  of	  Butler’s	  theory	  of	  power	  and	  
subjectivity,	   it	  pulls	  her	  reading	  in	  three	  competing,	  arguably	   irreconcilable,	  directions.	  
First,	  and	  most	  positively,	  It	  permits	  her	  to	  place	  Hegel	  and	  Foucault	  in	  fresh	  relief	  and	  
read	  them	  anew	  through	  a	  Spinoza	  inflected	  lens	  (Butler,	  1997,	  p.62).	  Second,	  and	  more	  
controversially,	  it	  imbues	  Hegel’s	  sense	  of	  life	  as	  an	  ethical	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  with	  
a	  life	  drive	  attributable	  to	  Spinoza’s	  ontology	  (Butler	  and	  Malabou,	  2011,	  p.637).	  Third,	  
and	   of	   greatest	   concern,	   Butler’s	   reading	   pushes	   Spinoza	   directly	   towards	   Hegelian	  
negativity	   and	   psychoanalysis.	   This	   complex	   mobilisation	   of	   Spinoza’s	   philosophy	   is	  
nonetheless	   compelling,	   as	   is	   the	   very	   specific	   utility	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   conatus	  
developed	  by	  Butler.	  I	  have	  argued	  against	  understanding	  the	  conatus	  as	  an	  ontological	  
capacity,	   an	   attribute	   of	   a	   subject,	   or	   an	   essentialist,	   pre-­‐discursive	   desire.	   Drawing	  
upon	  the	  morphological	   sense	  of	   the	  conatus	  sketched	  out	  above,	  and	  deconstructing	  
Butler’s	  reading	  of	  Spinoza’s	  concept	  of	  the	  conatus,	  I	  query	  the	  limits	  of	  Butler’s	  turn	  to	  
Spinoza.	  To	  what	  degree	  might	  the	  political	  sense of	  a	  non-­‐subjective	  conatus,	  described	  
in	  Section	  1	  as	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  power	  and	  force,	  unravel	  the	  basis	  
of	  Butler’s	  construction	  of	  the	  subject?	   
In	  her	  book	  Giving	  An	  Account	  of	  Oneself	  (2005)	  originally	  given	  as	  the	  Spinoza	  Lectures	  
at	   the	   University	   of	   Amsterdam	   in	   2002,	   Butler	   approaches	   once	  more	   the	   problems	  
addressed	   in	  her	   earlier	  work.	  After	  observing	   that	  The	  Psychic	   Life	   of	   Power	  perhaps	  
accepted	  too	  readily	  the	  ‘punitive	  scene	  of	  inauguration	  for	  the	  subject’,	  which	  depends	  
upon	  the	  internalization	  of	  the	  law	  and	  ‘the	  causal	  tethering	  of	  the	  subject	  to	  the	  deed’,	  
Butler	  supplements	  her	  arguably	  Hegelian	  account	  of	  desire	  with	  what	  for	  her	  becomes	  
a	  clear	  ethical	  injunction	  (2005,	  p.15).	  Following	  Spinoza,	  she	  posits	  ‘a	  certain	  desire	  to	  
persist’,	   a	   force	   of	   conative	   striving	   ‘that	   underwrites	   recognition,	   so	   that	   forms	   of	  
recognition	  or,	  indeed,	  forms	  of	  judgement	  that	  seek	  to	  relinquish	  or	  destroy,	  the	  desire	  
to	  persist,	  the	  desire	  for	  life	  itself	  undercut	  the	  very	  preconditions	  of	  recognition’	  (2005,	  
p.44).	  In	  her	  careful	  engagement	  with	  Spinoza	  (2006;	  passim	  2008;	  2009),	  as	  well	  as	  in	  a	  
co-­‐authored	   essay	  with	   Catherine	  Malabou	   (2011),	   Butler	   endeavours	   to	   draw	  Hegel,	  
Freud	   and	   Foucault	   in	   closer	   proximity	   to	   Spinoza’s	   philosophy.	   As	   she	   had	   already	  
observed	  in	  Psychic	  Life,	   
If	  desire	  has	  as	   its	   final	  aim	  the	  continuation	  of	   itself	   -­‐	  and	  here	  one	  might	  
link	   Hegel,	   Freud	   and	   Foucault	   all	   back	   to	   Spinoza’s	   conatus	   –	   then	   the	  
capacity	  of	  desire	  to	  be	  withdrawn	  and	  to	  reattach	  will	  constitute	  something	  
like	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   every	   strategy	   of	   subjection	   (Butler,	   1997,	   p.62,	  
emphasis	  added).	   
	  
With	  this	  formulation,	  Butler	  tethers	  the	  active,	  mobile,	  non-­‐subjective	  insistence	  of	  the	  
conatus	   to	   the	   capacity	   of	   a	   desire;	   a	   dynamic,	   dialectical	   logic	   of	   attachment	   and	  
detachment	  that	  appears,	  at	  least,	  to	  absolve	  the	  subject	  from	  the	  paradox	  framing	  its	  
inception	   and	  described	   in	  Psychic	   Life	   (1997,	   p.14-­‐5).	   It	   is	   this	   paradox,	  whereby	   the	  
subject	  is	  the	  vacillating	  scene	  of	  ambivalence,	  emerging	  both	  as	  effect	  of	  a	  prior	  power	  
and	  as	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   radical	   agency,	   that	   pushes	   the	   subject	  outside	  
itself	  into	  the	  field	  of	  power	  relations,	  hence	  illuminating	  the	  scene	  of	  subjectivation.	  It	  
is	   unsurprising	   that	   Butler	   turns	   to	   Spinoza	   to	   help	   her	   think	   the	   intimate	   reciprocity	  
between	   power	   and	   psychic	   life.	   On	   Spinoza’s	   reckoning	   it	   is,	   arguably,	   impossible	   to	  
separate	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   conatus	   from	   relations	   of	   encounter	   that	   construct	  
conceptions	  of	  life,	  conceptions	  of	  the	  human	  and	  the	  non-­‐human,	  as	  well	  as	  normative	  
patterns	  of	   existence.	  When	   Spinoza	  poses	   the	  well-­‐known	  observation	   regarding	  our	  
lack	   of	   knowledge	   about	   any	   body’s	   capabilities	   (EIII	   P2),	   he	   recognises	   that	   whilst	  
bodies	  may	  be	   subjected	   to	  asymmetric	  power	   relations,	   reified	  and	  held	   in	  bondage,	  
they	  nonetheless	  present	  a	  disturbing	  form	  of	  power,	  or	  potentia,	  that	  is	  neither	  easily	  
contained	  by,	  nor	  exchanged	  for	  a	  portion	  of	  political	  power.	  	  
	  
Rather	   than	  pushing	   further	   this	   productive	  political	   relation	  between	  an	   ineliminable	  
power	   or	   force	   and	   the	   scene	   of	   subjectivation	   –	   perhaps	   also	   bringing	   Foucault	   and	  
Spinoza	   closer	   together	   -­‐	   Butler	   propels	   Spinoza	   and	   Hegel	   towards	   psychoanalysis,	  
instead	   utilising	   the	   conatus	   to	   describe	   ‘a	   desire	   that	   attaches	   to	   existence’	   that	   is	  
‘presupposed	  by	  every	  act	  of	  the	  subject’	  (Butler,	  2011,	  p.611,	  p.624,	  emphasis	  added).	  
If	  Hegel’s	  conception	  of	  desire	  owes	  something	  to	  Spinoza,	  Butler	  reasons,	  might	  not	  the	  
‘the	  attribution	  of	  a	  life-­‐drive	  to	  Hegel’	  help	  us	  understand	  the	  terms	  of	  ethical	  struggle	  
in	  the	  Phenomenology	  of	  Spirit	  where	  ‘the	  “I”	  becomes	  redoubled,	  and	  ...bound	  up	  in	  a	  
scene	   of	   desire	   and	   fear’	   (2011,	   p.637,	   p.629).	   This	   mapping	   of	   the	   psyche	   is	   taken	  
further	   since	   Butler	   also	   identifies	   something	   akin	   to	   a	   death-­‐drive	   in	   Spinoza.	   Thus,	  
‘desiring	   life	   produces	   an	   ek-­‐stasis	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   desire,	   a	   dependency	   on	   an	  
externalization,	   something	   that	   is	   palpably	   not-­‐me,	   without	   which	   no	   persistence	   is	  
possible’	  (2006,	  p.113).	  It	  is	  this	  moment	  of	  negativity	  and	  decomposition	  of	  the	  subject	  
that,	   for	   Butler,	   opens	   ethical	   life	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   human	   vulnerability	   (see	   Butler,	  
2004)	  This	  move	  is	  a	  provocative	  one;	  it	  highlights	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  reading	  Spinoza’s	  
conatus	   as	   a	   schema	   of	   life	   and	   death	   and	   propels	   Butler’s	   politics	   into	   a	   kind	   of	  
mortalist	  or	  corporeal	  humanism,	  where	  an	  emphasis	  upon	  existential	  vulnerability	  risks	  
displacing	  a	   conflict-­‐riven	  account	  of	   conatus,	  as	  well	   as	  undermining	   the	  Foucauldian	  




My	  own	  reading	  of	  Spinoza’s	  conatus	  as	  a	  non-­‐subjective	  form	  has	  cautioned	  against	  its	  
formulation	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  essence	  or	  drive	  somehow	  outside	  or	  before	  power-­‐relations.	  
It	  reveals,	  I	  have	  argued,	  not	  just	  a	  desire	  for	  life,	  but	  something	  akin	  to	  the	  life	  of	  power	  
upon	  the	  field	  or	  scene	  of	  subjectivity.	  For	  many	  of	  her	  readers,	  it	  is	  the	  emphasis	  upon	  
processes	   of	   subjection	   and	   subjectivation	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   power	   relations	   that	   is	   the	  
most	  efficacious	  part	  of	  Butler’s	  approach,	  and	  where,	  in	  my	  view,	  she	  might	  have	  had	  
most	  to	  gain	  from	  her	  turn	  to	  Spinoza.	  Instead,	  the	  positing	  of	  a	  prediscursive	  conatus	  
and	  a	  presocial	  subject	  situates	  Butler’s	  analysis	  beyond	  critique	  and	  politics	  (see,	  also,	  
Chambers,	  2004,	  p.147;	  Braidotti,	  2006;	  Lloyd	  2008,	  p.101).	  Even	  allowing	  for	  the	  focus	  
on	  human	  desire	   and	   Spinoza’s	   account	   of	   how	   the	   power	   of	   a	   human	   body	  may	   be	  
hindered	  by	  affects	  deriving	  from	  sadness,	  by	  objects	  and	  forces	  of	  which	  we	  have	  little	  
understanding,	  there	   is	  very	   little	  within	  the	  Ethics	  to	  suggest	  a	  reading	  that	   limits	  the	  
conatus	  to	  a	  ‘human	  ontology’	  (Butler,	  2006,	  p.116),	  or	  to	  a	  life	  (or	  death)	  drive	  as	  Butler	  
proposes.	  Indeed,	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  radical	  exposure	  of	  the	  conatus	  to	  events	  
and	  encounters	  in	  the	  world	  that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  single	  drive	  or	  cause,	  Spinoza	  
unravels	  death	  and	  destruction,	  viewing	  them	  as	  reconfigurations	  or	  mutations	  of	  form.	  
In	  short,	  Spinoza	  thinks	  the	  metamorphosis	  of	  a	  body	  (see	  EIV,	  Ax).	   
	  
Ultimately,	   Butler	   presents	   Spinoza’s	   concept	   of	   conatus	   within	   an	   overly	   narrow	  
humanist	  ontology.	  She	  thus	  depoliticises	  Spinoza	  and	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  critical	  force	  
of	   the	   conatus	   as	   a	   non-­‐subjective	   form,	   and	   hence	   also	   the	   political	   promise	   of	  
Spinoza’s	   philosophy	   for	   rethinking	   agency	   and	   the	   scene	   of	   subjectivity.	   In	   contrast,	  
Bennett’s	  appropriation	  of	  Spinoza	  is	  ontologically	  expansive	  and	  her	  attention	  to	  a	  non-­‐
human	  milieu	  of	  actants	  is	  attuned	  to	  its	  own	  resonances	  with	  his	  philosophy.	  To	  what	  
extent	  might	  this	  vibrant	  materialism	  capture	  the	  dynamic	  scene	  of	  subjectivity?	  	  
	  
Jane	  Bennett:	  Lively	  matter	  and	  the	  absent	  scene	  of	  subjectivity	   
It	  is	  primarily	  the	  agency	  of	  non-­‐human	  assemblages	  that	  Jane	  Bennett’s	  Vibrant	  Matter	  
brings	   to	   the	   fore.	   Suggesting	   that	   what	   she	   calls	   thing-­‐power	   ‘bears	   a	   family	  
resemblance’	   to	   Spinoza’s	   concept	   of	   the	   conatus,	   Bennett	   seeks	   to	   dislodge	   the	  
superiority	  of	  human	  power	  or	  agency	  (Bennett,	  2010,	  p.2).	  Instead,	  Spinoza’s	  ‘conative	  
substance	  turns	  itself	  into	  confederate	  bodies’,	  and	  agency	  itself	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  
confederacy,	  or	  assemblage,	  of	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  elements	  (2010,	  p.22,	  p.23).	   In	  
Vibrant	  Matter,	  and	  elsewhere,	  Bennett	   theorises	  a	   form	  of	  distributive	  agency	  where	  
the	   myriad	   force	   of	   a	   range	   of	   actants	   is	   brought	   into	   play.	   In	   her	   example	   of	   an	  
electrical	   power	   grid,	   this	   vital	   materialism	   envelops	   ‘a	   volatile	   mix	   of	   coal,	   sweat,	  
electromagnetic	  fields,	  computer	  programs,	  electron	  streams,	  profit	  motives,	  heat,	  life-­‐
styles,	   nuclear	   fuel,	   plastic,	   fantasies	   of	   mastery,	   static,	   legislation,	   water,	   economic	  
theory,	  wire	  and	  wood	  –	  to	  name	  just	  some	  of	  the	  actants’	  (2010,	  p.25).	  It	  is	  a	  cascade	  
of	  different	  elements	  that	  mark	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  event	  like	  an	  electricity	  blackout.	  
Bennett	  characterises	  this	  assemblage	  of	  actants,	  or	  bodies,	  as	  a	  loose	  congregation	  or	  
heterogeneous	  alliance.	  To	  complicate	  agency	  in	  this	  way,	  according	  to	  Bennett,	   is	  not	  
to	   retreat	   from	  questions	  of	  political	   responsibility,	  but	   it	  does	   transform	   the	   locus	  of	  
human	   agency	   and	   ‘self-­‐interest’,	   both	   now	   distributed	   along	   a	   ‘continuum	   of	  
ontological	   types’	   (2010,	   p.37)	  where	   everything	  human	   co-­‐mingles	  with	   an	   extended	  
world	  of	  organic	  life.	  Indeed,	  despite	  Bennett’s	  clear	  intention	  in	  the	  book	  to	  bracket	  the	  
question	  of	  the	  human,	  and	  give	  the	  topic	  of	  subjectivity	  ‘short	  shrift’,	  her	  conception	  of	  
vital	  materialism	  at	   the	   very	   least	   alludes,	   in	  my	   view,	   to	   a	   recasting	  of	   the	   scene,	   or	  
locus,	   of	   subjectivity	   in	   keeping	   with	   the	   perspective	   developed	   here.	   In	   the	   final	  
chapter	  of	  her	  book,	  Bennett	  notes	  that	  the	  subject	  itself	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  vibrant	  matter:	  it	  is	  
‘its	   own	  outside’	   (2010,	   116,	  my	   emphasis).	  What	   are	  we	   to	   understand	  by	   this	  most	  
suggestive	  formulation	  and	  how	  might	  it	  relate	  to	  the	  political	  scene	  of	  subjectivity	  we	  
have	  uncovered	  via	  Spinoza?	   
Rejecting	  the	  schema	  of	  inside/outside	  required	  by	  a	  philosophy	  of	  a	  subject	  demanding	  
its	  own	  interiority	  and	   introspection,	  Bennett’s	  analysis	  usefully	  unhinges	  the	  question	  
of	   responsibility	   from	   a	   purely	   human	   intentionality.	   In	   clear	   contrast	   to	   Butler,	   for	  
whom	   the	   untethering	   of	   the	   subject	   as	   source	   of	   moral	   agency	   becomes	   an	  
indispensable	   basis	   for	   an	   ethics	   of	   the	   other,	   the	   ethico-­‐political	   question	   of	  
responsibility,	   for	  Bennett,	  becomes	  how	  to	  discern	   the	  presence	  of	   this	  often	  unruly,	  
and	  aleatory,	  potentia	  of	  vibrant	  matter;	  how	  to	  reconceive	  the	  now	  outmoded	  form	  of	  
(our)	  old	  moral	  maxims	  so	  that	   they	  might	  call	  out	   to,	  accommodate	  and	  express,	   the	  
vibrant	   life	   of	   matter?	   In	   order	   to	   respond,	   Bennett	   initiates	   a	   reflexive	   conceptual	  
gesture:	  she	  displaces	  the	  topic	  of	  subjectivity	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  recognising	  the	  
peculiar	   power,	   and	   strategic	   value,	   of	   anthropomorphism	   to	   reveal	   the	   agency	   of	  
unruly	  vitality	  (2010,	  p.120-­‐122).	  Thus,	  ‘It	  seems	  necessary	  and	  impossible	  to	  rewrite	  the	  
default	  grammar	  of	  agency,	  a	  grammar	  that	  assigns	  activity	   to	  people	  and	  passivity	   to	  
things’	  (2010,	  p.119).	  Bennett	  is	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  risks	  and	  twists	  of	  such	  a	  strategy.	  
Refusing	  the	  ‘futile	  attempt’	  to	  disentangle	  nature	  and	  culture,	  subject	  and	  object,	  the	  
human	   and	   the	   non-­‐human,	   she	   prefers	   instead	   to	   ‘...to	   engage	   more	   civilly,	  
strategically,	   and	   subtly	  with	   the	   non-­‐humans	   in	   the	   assemblages	   in	   which	   you,	   too,	  
participate’	  (2010,	  p.116).	  	  
	  
This	   attention	   to	   the	   paradox	   of	   the	   subject	   is	   commendable,	   but	   the	   ethical	   move	  
attached	   to	   Bennett’s	   approach	   is	   not	  without	   its	   difficulties	   since	   it	   risks	   leaving	   the	  
human	   subject	   insufficiently	   deconstructed.	   It	   is	   not	   simply	   the	   displacement	   and	  
postponement	  of	  the	  ‘topics	  of	  human	  subjectivity,	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  interiority,	  
...of	  what	  distinguishes	  the	  human	  from	  the	  animal,	  plant,	  and	  thing’	  (2010,	  p.120)	  that	  
is	  troubling,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  engagement	  still	  appear	  to	  bypass	  the	  scene,	  
the	  production,	  of	   subjectivity	   itself.	  Surely	   it	   is	  not	   so	  much	   the	   inhering	  of	  a	  subject	  
within	  this	  heterogeneous	  force-­‐field	  of	  nature	  as	  one	  actant	  amongst	  many,	  but	  rather	  
the	   decomposition	   and	   dispersal	   of	   a	   distinctly	   human	   power	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wider	  
morphology	   of	   relations	   that	   in	   turn	   transforms	   the	   subject.	   Conceived	   as	   ‘its	   own	  
outside’	   as	   Bennett	   puts	   it,	   the	   subject	   unravels	   and	   becomes	   something	   else:	   In	  my	  
view,	   it	   is	   this	   scene	   that	   demands	   political	   analysis.	   Adrian	   Johnston	   has	   similarly	  
argued	   that	   in	   overestimating	   the	   reciprocity	   between	   nature	   and	   subject	   such	  
approaches	  ‘risk	  squelching	  the	  subject	  altogether’	  (Johnston,	  2012,	  164).	  Other	  recent	  
critics	   of	   new	  materialism	   have	   also	   identified	   a	   depoliticisation	   in	   a	   form	   of	   critique	  
‘that	   seems	   to	   naturalize,	   if	   not	   normalize	   a	   vision	   of	   life	   forged	   only	   through	  
collaboration,	  coordination	  and	   interdependence’	   (Washick	  and	  Wingrove,	  2015,	  p.66;	  
Hinton	   and	   Van	   der	   Tuin,	   2014).	   This	   perceived	   focus	   upon	   reciprocity	   rather	   than	  
struggle	   appears	   ironic	   given	   the	   proximity	   of	   Bennett’s	   vital	  materialism	   to	   agonistic	  
democracy	   with	   its	   attention	   to	   conflict	   and	   struggle	   (Bennett,	   2006).	   Whilst	   the	  
critiques	  of	   both	   Johnston	  and	  Washick	   and	  Wingrove	   are	  premised	  upon	  unhelpfully	  
reductive	   views	   of	   the	   ‘flat’	   ontologies	   entailed	   by	   new	   materialism	   (Johnston,	   for	  
example,	   writes	   frequently	   of	   a	   Spinozist	   holism	   entirely	   out	   of	   place	   with	   the	  
continentally	  inspired	  reading	  of	  him	  developed	  by	  my	  own	  reading),	  their	  observations	  
about	   the	   fate	   of	   political	   critique	   nonetheless	   require	   careful	   consideration.	   I	   agree	  
with	   Bennett	   that	   there	   exists	   an	   intimate	   connection	   between	   an	   immanent	  
generativity,	   or	   creative	   praxis	   of	   matter	   and	   various	   figures	   of	   the	   human,	   but	   an	  
account	  is	  required	  nonetheless	  of	  the	  genesis	  and	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  subjective	  in	  
the	   life	   of	   power.	  Without	   this,	   vital	   materialism	   holds	   in	   abeyance	   the	   rich	   political	  
analysis	  entailed	  by	  a	  view	  of	  the	  conatus	  as	  a	  site	  of	  conflict	  and	  struggle,	  power	  and	  
mobilisation.	   
	  
In	  her	  response	  to	  Washick	  and	  Wingrove,	  Bennett	  goes	  some	  way	  towards	  a	  political	  
analysis	   of	   these	   relations	   of	   power.	   She	   clarifies	   the	   ethico-­‐political	   content	   of	   new	  
materialism	  as	   including	  the	  attempt	  to	   ‘reverse	  engineer’	  assemblages,	  (by	  discerning	  
‘key	  operators’	  and	  parts	  most	  susceptible	  to	  transformation),	  and	  understanding	  how	  
the	  parts	  of	  an	  assemblage	  work	  (Bennett,	  2014,	  p.85).	  Furthermore,	  the	  ethical	  maxim	  
of	  new	  materialism	   is	  not	   to	  be	   collapsed	  either	   into	  an	  extended	  Kantian	   categorical	  
imperative	  or	  a	  Heideggerian	  call	  of	  Being.	  Rather,	  ethical	  responsiveness	  to	  ‘things-­‐in-­‐
assemblage’	  has	  a	  distinctly	  practical	  aim:	   ‘to	   find	   the	  best	  way	   to	  pursue	  my	  conatus	  
while	  minimising	   the	   ill	  effects	  upon	  others	  and	  upon	  the	  whole	  eco-­‐system	  on	  which	  
everything	  depends’	  (Washick	  and	  Wingrove,	  2014,	  p.72-­‐74;	  Bennett,	  2014,	  p.86).	  These	  
suggestive	   remarks	   deserve	   amplification.	   But	   how	   are	  we	   to	   understand	   this	   uneasy	  
reference	   to	   the	   conatus	   as	   a	   human	   property,	   and	   what	   might	   it	   mean	   to	   ‘reverse	  
engineer’	  an	  assemblage?	   
	  
To	   think	   about	   how	  we	  might	   ‘reverse-­‐engineer’	   an	   assemblage,	   as	  Bennett	   suggests,	  
requires,	  in	  my	  view,	  an	  account	  of	  a	  non-­‐subjective	  conatus,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  morphological	  
analysis	   that	   gives	  due	  weight	   to	   the	  presence	  of	  power	  and	   conflict.	   This	  permits	   an	  
understanding	  of	  an	  assemblage	  as	  always	  already	  a	  form	  of	  capture	  of,	  and	  alignment	  
between,	   bodies	   (which	   implies	   forms	   of	   exclusion	   and	   might	   include	   asymmetries	  
rather	   than	   simply	   reciprocities	   and	   collaborations);	  we	  must	   ask	  which	   relations	   and	  
what	  kind	  of	  mechanisms	  enable	  it	  to	  persist	  as	  this	  form,	  this	  scene,	  and	  no	  other?	  Are	  
there	   relations	   of	   inequality,	   irregularity,	   between	   some	   elements	   that	   diminish	   or	  
enhance	   their	   potentia?	   In	   particular,	   how	   might	   mutations	   in	   affect	   relate	   to	   the	  
conative	   force	   of	   a	   complex	   individuum?	   Decoupling	   affect	   from	   human	   agency	  
refocuses	   attention	   on	   the	   affective	   communication	   of	   ideas	   and	   images.	   These	  
impersonal	   ideational	   forces	   are	  a	  necessary	  element	  of	  morphological	   analysis:	   ideas	  
enable,	  mobilise	  and	  conduct	   forms	  of	   relation;	  whether	   these	   incite	  exclusions	   in	   the	  
creation	  of	  forms	  of	  life	  and	  subjectivity,	  or	  act	  as	  transitive	  links	  that	  hold	  relations	  in	  
place.	   
	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	  Bennett’s	  use	  of	   Spinoza	   is	  much	  more	  promising	   than	  Butler’s	   for	   the	  
argument	   developed	   here.	  We	   have	   seen	   how	   she	   presses	   the	   various	   modalities	   of	  
materiality	  and	  agency	  much	  further	  than	  Butler’s	  residual	  humanist	  position,	  where	  the	  
principle	   of	   equal	   vulnerability	   becomes	   the	   touchstone	   for	   politics	   and	   ethics.	   Butler	  
can	  never	  completely	  arrive	  at	  the	  materialist	  scene	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  remains	  tied	  in	  
an	  anthropomorphic	  tangle	  of	  the	  kind	  Bennett	  hopes	  to	  break	  lose.	  However,	  Bennett’s	  
bracketing	  of	  the	  scene	  of	  subjectivity	  entails	  a	  displacement	  of	  the	  vital	  matter	  of	  the	  
subject.	   I	   suggest	   the	   expansive	   ontology	   of	   vibrant	  materialism	   requires	   this	   kind	   of	  
morphological	  analysis	  of	  the	  life	  of	  power	  upon	  the	  field	  of	  subjectivity.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  I	  
think	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy	  makes	  a	  significant	  contribution.	  	  
	  
IV.	  Unravelling	  the	  subject:	  from	  metaphysical	  subject	  to	  individuum	   
My	  own	  reading	  of	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy	  clarifies	  how	  one	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  scene	  of	  (an	  
unfinished)	  subjectivity	  without	  embracing	  an	  ontologically	  thick	  concept	  of	  the	  human	  
subject,	   or	   becoming	   ensnared	   in	   forms	   of	   anthropomorphism.	   Most	   significantly,	   it	  
allows	  me	  to	  place	  a	  dispersed	  notion	  of	  the	  subject	  into	  dialogue	  with	  new	  materialist	  
accounts	  of	  the	  agency	  of	  things.	  Bestowing	  attention	  upon	  the	  scene	  of	  dispersal	  and	  
remobilisation	  of	  subjectivity	  (albeit	  sometimes	  in/as	  another	  form)	  permits	  the	  political	  
theorist	   to	   consider	   precisely	   how	   the	   conatus	   of	   this	   complex	  morphological	   form	   is	  
mobilized,	   and	   gains	   both	   coherence	   and	   a	   strategic	   sense	   of	   conjunction	   amidst	  
disparate	  parts	  in	  order	  to	  persist	  over	  time.	  In	  a	  recent	  study	  of	  contemporary	  French	  
philosophy,	   Ian	   James	   has	   observed	   elements	   of	   realignment	   away	   from	   linguistic	  
paradigms	  and	  toward	  a	  focus	  upon	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  real	  combined	  with	  a	  renewal	  
of	   the	   subject	   (James,	   2011).	   It	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   form	  of	   renewal	   that	   I	   am	  arguing	   for	  
here,	  but	  it	  is	  worth	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  perceived	  need	  to	  continue	  to	  address	  the	  space	  
of	  subjectivity	  within	  contemporary	  thought	  -­‐	  however	  this	  may	  be	  theorised.	   
	  
Let	   us	   very	   briefly	   revisit	   the	   key	   parts	   of	   the	   argument	   developed	   thus	   far.	   I	   have	  
presented	  a	  concept	  of	  morphology	  as	  a	  heuristic	  device	  to	  map	  the	  dynamic	  activity	  of	  
the	   conatus	   conceived	   as	   a	   field	   of	   forces	   through	  which	   relations	   between	  elements	  
interact	   and	   take	   form.	   This	   idea	   of	   morphology	   is	   attuned	   with	   Spinoza’s	   own	  
geometric	  study	  of	  human	  actions,	  portrayed	  by	  him	  ‘...just	  as	   if	   it	  were	  a	  question	  of	  
lines,	   planes	   and	   bodies’	   (E	   III,	   Pref).	   As	   a	   study	   of	   the	   form	   of	   things,	   morphology	  
provides	   a	   conceptual	   mapping	   of	   the	   relations	   composing	   a	   particular	   form	   or	  
individuum;	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  tracking	  their	  degree	  of	  complexity,	  magnitude,	  variation	  and,	  
of	   course,	   their	   conative	   force	   and	   power.	   Being	   composed	   of	   a	   series	   of	   variable	  
relations,	   an	   individuum	  maintains	   a	   degree	   of	   unity	   and	   coherence,	   or	  metastability	  
when	  the	  elements	  composing	  it	  are	  held	  together	  by	  a	  specific	  ratio	  of	  forces	  (Balibar,	  
1997,	   p.22).	   The	   speed	   or	   intensity	   of	   encounters	   between	   bodies	   are	   prefigured	   by	  
powerful	   concatenations	   of	   relations	   (be	   these	   power,	   intensity,	   or	   affect).	   Since	   the	  
subject,	   as	   an	   unfinished	   form,	   comprises	   only	   one	   element	   amongst	   a	   collection	   of	  
things	   upon	   which	   its	   ‘own’	   existence	   and	   motion	   depends,	   I	   am	   similarly	   able	   to	  
theorise	   this	   morphological	   scene	   of	   subjectivity	   (like	   any	   other	   thing)	   as	   dispersed,	  
plural,	  mutative	  and	  malleable.	  I	  have	  argued,	  with	  Spinoza,	  that	  the	  conatus	  cannot	  be	  
tied	  to	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  subject	  as	  desire	  because	  it	  is	  the	  striving	  to	  persevere	  of	  each	  
thing	  (see	  EIII	  P7).	  The	  actual	  essence	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  thing	  must	  be	  tied	  to	  its	  elemental	  
reality.	  This	  formulation	  frees	  the	  conatus	  from	  a	  subject-­‐centred	  approach	  and	  disrupts	  
the	   notion	   of	   essence	   (human	   or	   otherwise),	   which	   is	   now	   aligned	   with	   the	   power,	  
action	  and	  interaction	  of	  any	  thing.	  This	  reading	  puts	  a	  creative	  dissonance	  to	  work	  upon	  
concepts	  by	  considering	  the	  ways	  through	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  conatus	  traverses	  and	  
unravels	  a	  concept	  of	  metaphysical	  subject.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  conatus	  as	  this	  open	  series	  
of	   power	   relations	   presents	   us	  with	   various	   (political)	  mutations	   of	   the	   life	   of	   power	  
upon	  the	  field	  or	  scene	  of	  subjectivity.	  	  
	  
This	  reading	  of	  Spinoza	  generates	  a	  powerful	  politics,	  especially	  when	  we	  combine	  this	  
account	   of	   the	   individuum,	   with	   his	   reading,	   in	   the	   Political	   Treatise,	   of	   the	  
metamorphosis	   of	   the	   collective	   force	   of	   the	   body	   from	   unruly	   crowd,	   or	   vulgas,	   to	  
libera	  multitude.	  These	  are	  each	  forms	  of	  ‘political	  subjectivity’,	  but	  Spinoza	  recognised	  
that	  the	  persistence	  and	  power	  of	  each	  depended	  wholly	  upon	  the	  relations	  composing	  
them	   (TP,	   III	   and	   IV).	   We	   can	   certainly	   use	   this	   analysis	   today	   to	   investigate	   the	  
persistence	  of	  political	   struggles,	   and	   their	  decomposition,	  over	   time	   (most	   influential	  
here	   has	   been	  Hardt	   and	  Negri,	   2001,	   2005).	   Some	  political	   and	   social	   theorists	   have	  
also	   begun	   to	   explore	   this	   collective	   composition	   of	   the	   individual,	   drawing	   upon	   the	  
important	   concept	   of	   transindividualism,	   transported	   by	   Etienne	   Balibar	   from	   the	  
ontogenetic	  philosophy	  of	  Gilbert	  Simondon	  to	  the	  fertile	  context	  of	  Spinoza’s	  ontology	  
(see	   Combes,	   2013,	   Read,	   2016).	  However,	  we	  might	   also	   reach	   beyond	   these	   recent	  
explorations,	   insist	   upon	   an	   even	   wider	   understanding	   of	   individuation	   as	   a	  
morphological	  process,	  and	  thereby	  entertain	  Spinoza’s	  view	  of	  a	  Nature	  whose	  parts,	  
or	  bodies,	  vary	  in	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  ways,	  creating	  increasing	  degrees	  of	  complexity,	  
and	  a	  greater	  power	  to	   interact	  with,	  and	  persist	   in	  a	  multiplicity	  of	   things	   (EII	  P13	  L7	  
Schol).	   
 
In	  accordance	  with	  this	  latter	  view,	  I	  understand	  by	  politics	  any	  situation	  where	  there	  is	  
a	  composition	  of	  powers	  acting.	  Forms	  of	  interaction	  have	  infinite	  possibilities	  but	  what	  
makes	   their	   activity	   political	   is	   the	   setting	   in	   motion	   of	   a	   dynamic	   play	   of	   power	  
relations,	   where	   relations	   and	   forces	   begin	   to	   take	   hold	   of	   the	   elements	   available.	  
Politics,	   then,	   is	   literally	   the	   mode	   of	   composing	   a	   morphology	   of	   relations,	   of	  
constructing	   a	   scene	   of	   subjectivity	   (perhaps	   by	   strategies	   of	   capture,	   combination,	  
containment,	   compensation,	   exchange	   of	   parts,	   renewal,	   and	   transformation	   that	  
indicate	   the	   life	  of	  power).	  How	  precisely	   these	   strategies	   take	  hold	  of	   relations,	  how	  
they	  produce	   significant	   changes	  not	   just	  of	  degree	  but	  of	  kind,	   to	  paraphrase	  Donna	  
Haraway	   (2015),	   and	  by	  what	  means	   they	  are	  mobilised	   (for	   example,	   the	   techniques	  
through	   which	   they	   circulate	   and	   organise	   this	   scene),	   are	   precisely	   questions	   for	  
politics.	  	  
	  
How,	  then,	  does	  politics	  mobilise	  and	  combine	  the	  power	  and	  force	  of	  the	  conatus,	  as	  
we	  have	  understood	   it	   here?	  To	   respond	   to	   this	  question,	   I’d	   like	   to	  enlist	   the	   recent	  
work	   of	   Frederic	   Lordon	   (2014)	   and	   then	   finally	   reflect	   briefly	   upon	   the	   kind	   of	  
contribution	   a	   morphological	   analysis	   can	   make	   to	   debates	   within	   contemporary	  
political	  theory.	  I	  endorse	  Lordon’s	  hypothesis	   in	  Willing	  Slaves	  of	  Capital:	  Spinoza	  and	  
Marx	  on	  Desire	  that	  the	  conatus	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  every	  kind	  of	  servitude,	  and	  I	  applaud	  
him	  for	  recognising	  the	  validity	  of	  Spinoza’s	  thought,	  alongside	  that	  of	  Marx,	  for	  thinking	  
about	  power.	   Lordon’s	   approach	  exemplifies	  one	  kind	  of	   analysis,	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  
well-­‐developed	  Spinozist	  position,	  of	  the	  life	  of	  power	  upon	  the	  field	  of	  subjectivity,	  and	  
I	   will	   utilise	   Lordon’s	   discussion	   of	   the	   conatus	   to	   reflect	   further	   upon	   the	   political	  
strategies	   of	   composition	   and	   formation	   enabled	   by	   my	   own	   study	   of	   morphology.	  
Lordon’s	   focus	   is	   ‘the	  passionate	  complex	  of	   the	  employment	  relation’	  and	  the	  way	   in	  
which	   these	   relations	   (from	   practices	   of	   empowerment,	   personal	   coaching	   and	   self-­‐
development	  at	  the	  workplace,	   to	  threats	  and	  sanctions	  emanating	  from	  the	  precarity	  
of	  work)	  seek	  to	  capture	  ‘the	  persistent	  heterogeneity	  of	  the	  conatus’	  viewed	  by	  him	  as	  
a	  mobile	  energy	  or	  desire	   (without	  a	  clear	  object	  or	  goal)	   that	   ‘sets	  bodies	   in	  motion’	  
(Lordon,	   2014,	   29,	   36).	   I	   have	   earlier	   questioned	   and	   rejected	   this	   narrow	   regard	   for	  
desire	  in	  Butler’s	  usage	  of	  Spinoza,	  but	  Lordon	  refuses	  this	  residual	  Hegelian	  position:	  if	  
the	  conatus	   is	  our	  energy	  or	  desire,	  for	  him	  it	   is	  produced	  collaboratively,	  and	  ‘...owes	  
everything	   to	   the	   interpellation	   of	   things’	   (2014,	   p.57,	  my	   emphasis).	  With	   this	  move	  
outside	  the	  subject,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  one	  that,	  like	  Bennett,	  appears	  to	  recognise	  the	  power	  
and	  participation	   of	   things,	   Lordon’s	   analysis	   helps	   to	   explain	   how	   relations	   of	   power	  
combine	  or	  hold	  a	  nominally	  dispersed	  or	  mutative	   subjectivity	   in	  a	   static	  position	   (of	  
domination	   or	   servitude),	   whilst	   offering	   an	   example	   of	   how	   dispositions,	   habits	   and	  
beliefs	   are	   a	   function	  of	  material	   practices.	   Conceiving	   the	   field	   of	   social	   conflict	   as	   a	  
‘geometry	  of	  vectors’,	  Lordon	  presents	  the	  struggle	  to	  capture	  the	  energy	  of	  the	  conatus	  
as	   a	   strategic	   effort	   to	   create	   ‘a	   continuous	   gradient	   of	   domination’.	   This	   analysis	  
illustrates	  how	  contemporary	  neo-­‐liberalism	  has	   sought	   to	  orient	   conatus	  vectors	   in	  a	  
certain	  direction,	  to	  develop	  complete	  co-­‐linearisation	  or	  coincidence.	  If	  such	  strategies	  
of	   mobilisation	   were	   successful,	   we	  might	   expect	   the	   scene	   of	   subjectivity	   described	  
here	  to	  all	  but	  disappear.	  Indeed,	  Lordon	  suggests	  that	  the	  conatus	  is	  always	  saturated	  
or	  fully	  activated	  (2014,	  p.133-­‐4).	  This	  attention	  to	  the	  immanence	  of	  power,	  (arguably	  
in	   opposition	   to	   post-­‐structuralist	   theories	   of	   resistance	   that	   require	   some	   reserve	   or	  
lack	   from	  whence	   resistance	  moves),	   leads	   Lordon,	   in	   Spinozist	   fashion,	   to	   emphasise	  
degrees	  of	  alignment	  and	  adjustment,	  where	  the	  angle	  of	  the	  vector	  can	  also	  give	  rise	  to	  
produce	  a	  ‘misalignment’	  or	  ‘the	  clinamen	  of	  the	  individual	  conatus’	  (2014,	  34-­‐	  36).	  This	  
analysis	  enriches	  my	  own	  morphological	  analysis	  of	  mutations	  in	  the	  life	  of	  power	  whilst	  
helping	  to	  shift	  attention	  outside	  the	  subject	  to	  understand	  the	  forces	  and	  causes	  that	  
combine	  to	  create	  the	  scene	  of	  (neoliberal,	  for	  Lordon)	  subjectivity.	  This	  mapping	  of	  the	  
conatus	   as	   a	   vector	   of	   power	   also	   gestures	   in	   the	   general	   direction	   of	   my	   own	  
formulation	   of	   a	   non-­‐subjective	   conatus	   although,	   ultimately,	   Lordon	   never	   embraces	  
this	  kind	  of	  approach	  and	  confines	  his	  discussion	  to	  human/social	  relations.	  	  
	  
The	   theory	  of	  morphology	  developed	  here	  has	   endeavoured	   to	   stay	   close	   to	   the	  new	  
materialist	   reading	  of	  Spinoza	  whilst	  making	  room	  for	   the	  scene	  of	  subjectivity.	   I	  have	  
demonstrated	   how	   Spinoza’s	   own	   avoidance	   of	   the	   lure	   of	   anthropocentrism	   helps	  
make	   sense	  of	   the	  paradoxical	   idea	  of	  a	   subjectivity	  without	   the	  metaphysical	   subject	  
reconfigured	  as	  part	  of	  an	  individuum.	  Utilising	  Spinoza’s	  philosophy	  in	  a	  quite	  different	  
way	  to	  Butler	  and	  Bennett,	   I	  have	  proposed	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  non-­‐subjective	  conatus,	  and	  
suggested	   that	  a	  morphological	   analysis	  of	   relations	   is	   the	  best	  way	   to	  understand	   its	  
perseverance	   and	   transformation.	   My	   analysis	   endeavours	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	  
unravelling	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  its	  persistence	  in	  other	  forms.	  It	  has	  detached	  the	  conatus	  
from	   the	   narrow	   field	   of	   human	   desire,	   and	   focused	   attention	   upon	   the	   scene	   of	  
subjectivity	  as	  folded	  into	  a	  wider,	  complex	  body	  whose	  relations	  exceed	  it	  and	  remain	  
necessary	   for	   its	   continued	   existence.	   Subjectivity	   is	   thus	   composed	   of	   more	   than	  
human	  aspects.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  morphological	  analysis	  returns	  a	  study	  of	  power	  
to	   the	  discussion:	   the	  conatus	   is	   the	  power	   to	  persist	  but	   it	   is	  also	  a	  differential	   force	  
and	  site	  of	  conflict.	  	  
	  
These	  new	  observations	  bring	  sharply	  into	  focus	  some	  of	  the	  apparent	  fault	  lines	  within	  
contemporary	   theory	   that	   have	   sometimes	   created	   unhelpful	   breaks	   or	   fractures	  
between	   approaches,	   as	   seen	   in	   the	   various	   linguistic,	   discursive,	   materialist	   or	  
biological	  turns	  of	  recent	  years.	  Adopting	  the	  kind	  of	  morphological	  analysis	  presented	  
here,	  we	  might	  usefully	  revisit	  some	  of	  these	  fault	  lines	  in	  order	  to	  trace	  out	  important	  
conceptual	   continuities,	   intersections,	   and	   affinities	   between	   these	   often	   opposed	  
approaches.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  by	  placing	  the	  spotlight	  on	  the	  scene	  of	  subjectivity,	  the	  
contemporary	   political	   theorist	   might	   avoid	   the	   false	   antinomy	   between	   agency	   and	  
structure,	  whilst	   continuing	   to	   track	   the	  production	  and	  composition	  of	   subjectivity	   in	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  ii	  Some	  readers	  might	  here	  recall	  the	  work	  of	  Paul	  Pierson	  (2000)	  on	  ‘increasing	  returns’.	  He	  analyses	  the	  
temporal	  patterns	  of	  stability	  and	  change	  within	  which	  forms	  of	  political	  organization	  unfold	  and	  persist	  
as	  part	  of	  a	  dense	  network	  of	  major	  and	  minor	  historical	  and	  political	  factors.	  iii	  All	  references	  to	  Spinoza’s	  texts	  are	  taken	  from	  Curley’s	  translation	  (Spinoza,	  1985),	  unless	  otherwise	  
stated,	  and	  use	  the	  following	  abbreviations:	  EII	  (Part	  II	  of	  the	  Ethics);	  Dem	  (demonstration)	  P	  
(proposition);	  Def	  (definition);	  Scol	  (scolium);	  Cor	  (corollary);	  L	  (Letter);	  PCP	  (Principles	  of	  Cartesian	  
Philosophy).	  iv	  Bennett’s	  form	  of	  vital	  materialism	  draws	  Spinoza	  closer	  to	  the	  early	  materialism	  of	  Democritus,	  
Lucretius,	  Epicurus,	  to	  Nietzsche,	  Diderot,	  Thoreau,	  Bergson,	  and	  further,	  to	  Deleuze,	  Latour,	  Varela,	  and	  
others.	  Butler,	  in	  contrast,	  draws	  Spinoza	  close	  to	  Hegel	  and	  Adorno,	  to	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  Merleau-­‐
Ponty,	  and	  to	  her	  longstanding	  interest	  in	  psychoanalytic	  theory.	  v	  Both	  references	  to	  the	  subject	  as	  subjectum	  in	  Spinoza’s	  Ethics	  occur	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  first	  kind	  of	  
(illusory)	  knowledge	  (see	  EIII	  p5;	  EV	  ax1).	  vi	  For	  opposing	  views	  see	  Collier	  (2002)	  and	  Rice	  (1990).	  The	  terms	  of	  this	  debate	  repeat	  the	  antinomy	  
between	  agency	  and	  structure,	  although	  Collier’s	  nuanced	  argument	  certainly	  avoids	  this	  opposition.	  vii	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  imagination	  as	  such	  an	  impersonal	  conductor	  see	  Williams	  (2007).	  viii	  I	  suggest	  this	  is	  a	  weak	  ontology	  since	  it	  provides	  only	  a	  frame,	  or	  set	  of	  conditions,	  for	  the	  political	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